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At the start of December, the U.S. President brought together the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a truce. The commitment involved an end to years of warfare in the turbulent eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Not long after, however, a completely opposite method for violence emerged. Officials confirmed that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, striking sites linked to the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President stated, I had cautioned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Change of Direction

These divergent actions exemplifies the core tenet of the U.S. policy towards sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a de-emphasis from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a declared focus on economic deals and ending wars—despite the fact that this aligns with the new air campaign in Nigeria remains to be seen.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan often repeated for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a high-ranking U.S. state department official on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A presidential representative stated this, noting the President “approaches Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Inconsistencies

This change is major, but analysts warn it is early to assess its effects. The approach is complicated by the President’s direct manner, which has included conflicts with long-standing U.S. partners and insults directed at Africans.

“The core tenet is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said a scholar for Africa studies at a major foreign policy council.

Major actions have included:

• Dismantlement of the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. Research estimates this could lead to millions of additional deaths globally by 2030, with a significant portion in Africa.
• Implementing visa restrictions on citizens from numerous African countries and suspending most refugee admissions.
• Unleashing a global tariff campaign that has hurt African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

International Disinterest and Tensions

Unlike his predecessors, the President avoided sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known engagement with African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later acknowledged using.

“The continent ranks dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” stated the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A significant dispute has erupted with South Africa, reportedly shaped by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The narrative of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” commented a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Diplomacy and Selective Involvement

An analogous tension emerged with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This ran up against Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation split between Christians and Muslims and plagued by security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts said that the forceful rhetoric may have pushed the government into greater action on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had consented to the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has publicly expressed his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, to date without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” noted one conflict expert.

An Echo of Rivals

Experts characterize the new U.S. approach as paralleling that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have deepened their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on economic interests.

“It’s a long overdue recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the new approach likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The involvement that we are talking about isn't about spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a transactional posture towards Africa,” the observer stated.